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Abstract This paper make an investigation of a secure unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)-aided communica-
tion network based on directional modulation(DM), in which one ground base station (Alice), one legitimate
full-duplex (FD) user (Bob) and one illegal receiver (Eve) are involved. In this network, Alice acts as a con-
trol center to transmit confidential message and artificial noise (AN). The UAV user, moving along a linear
flight trajectory, is intended to receive the useful information from Alice. At the same time, it also sends
AN signals to further interference Eve’s channel. Aiming at maximizing secrecy rate during the UAV flight
process, a joint optimization problem is formulated corresponding to power allocation (PA) factors, beam-
forming vector, AN projection matrices. For simplicity, maximum ratio transmission, null-space projection
and the leakage-based method are applied to form the transmit beamforming vector, AN projection matrix at
Alice, and AN projection vector at Bob, respectively. Following this, the optimization problem reduces into
a bivariate optimization programme with two PA factors. We put forward an alternating iterative algorithm
to optimize the two PA factors. Simulation results demonstrate that the proposed strategy for FD mode
achieves a higher SR than the half-duplex (HD) mode, and outperforms the FD mode with fixed PA strategy.
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1 Introduction
With the highly diversified application scenarios, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)-aided wireless com-
munications have a promising prospect in the coming future. [1–4]. UAV has a variety of advantages,
such as high mobility, flexible deployment, controllable trajectory and low cost [5–7]. The problems
surrounding the UAV-aided networks mainly focus on trajectory optimization, user scheduling, resource
allocation, energy harvesting, etc [7–10]. Besides, due to the broadcast characteristic of wireless signals,
UAV-aided wireless communications are vulnerable to be hostilely attacked. Consequently, secure wireless
transmission in UAV wireless networks is a very challenging issue at present and in the further [11–14].
A cooperative jamming approach in [11] is proposed to secure the UAV communication through utilizing
the neighbor UAVs as jammers to defend against the eavesdropper. For purpose of maximizing the min-
imum average secrecy rate, the authors in [12] leverage the alternating iterative algorithm and successive
convex approximation technique to jointly optimize the trajectories and transmit powers of UAV base
station/jammers. The authors of [13] investigate a UAV-enabled secure communication system that the
*Corresponding author (email: shufeng0101@163.com)
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UAV trajectories and user scheduling are jointly adjusted to maximize the minimum worst-case secrecy
rate among the users within each period. In [14], the authors optimize the power allocation (PA) strategy
by combining the transmission outage probability and secrecy outage probability as a main performance
metric.
Directional modulation (DM), as a key physical layer security (PLS) technology in wireless communi-
cation, has attracted a lot of attention from both academia and industry [15–17]. To further protect the
security of UAV communication network, DM technology has been increasingly applied to UAV network
due to the line-of-sight (LoS) aerial-ground link [1, 18, 19]. Artificial noise (AN) is usually utilized to
disturb the potential eavesdroppers to improve the PLS in DM networks [20, 21]. The authors in [22]
project the orthogonal AN on the null-space of the steering vector along the intended direction to enhance
the PLS. For the multicast scenarios, both the useful precoding vector and the AN projection matrix can
be designed according to the leakage-based criterion [23]. In [24], the authors maximize the secrecy rate
by the alternating iterative PA strategy, which achieves a significant SR gain in the case of small-scale
antenna array. In DM systems, the direction of arrival (DOA) needs to be estimated in advance for the
DM synthesis. Two phase alignment methods are proposed to estimate DOA based on the parametric
method in [25]. In [26], the authors presented a robust beamforming scheme of combining main-lobe-
integration and leakage to further improved the security in DM systems in the presence of direction angle
measurement errors. A secure precise wireless transmission with low-complexity structure by random
subcarrier selection (RSCS) is proposed in [27].
To improve the spectral efficiency of next-generation wireless networks, full-duplex (FD) transmission
has attracted fast-growing attentions [28–30]. In [28], a cooperative FD jammer is introduced to generate
the precoded AN for guaranteeing the security of legitimate transmissions without knowing the eaves-
dropper’s channel state information (CSI). The authors of [30] design a FD jamming relay network, in
which the relay node transmits jamming signals to interfere the eavesdropper while receives the data from
the source at the same time. FD transceivers are also adopted to enhance wireless PLS for multi-hop
relaying systems in [29]. When the relays receive information signals from the previous adjacent node,
they simultaneously transmit AN signals to the eavesdropper.
Motivated by the above studies, in this paper, we investigate a PA strategy in UAV-aided commu-
nication networks where UAV user operates in FD mode. With the purpose of maximum secrecy rate
(Max-SR), we formulate a joint optimization problem to design the beamforming vector, AN projection
matrix, and PA factors. This problem is very hard to tackle due to the complicated objective function
and the coupled variables. For simplicity, maximum ratio transmission (MRT) is applied to form the
transmit beamforming vector, the AN projection matrix for Alice is constructed by the null-space pro-
jection (NSP) criterion, and the AN projection vector for Bob is designed by the leakage-based method.
As such, the optimization problem reduces into a bivariate optimization programme with two PA factors.
Using the given PA factor of the ground base station transmitter, we can design the optimal PA factor
of legitimate UAV user. Correspondingly, with the given PA factor of UAV transmitter, we can derive
the optimal PA factor of ground base station. Subsequently, an alternating iterative algorithm between
two PA factors is proposed to further improve the SR performance. This algorithm is repeated until the
terminal condition is satisfied. Simulation results also verify that the SR performance of the proposed
strategy achieves a substantial gain over HD mode with fixed PA strategy.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. System model is described in Section II. Section
III gives the beamforming vector and AN projection vector, and an alternating iterative algorithm for
PA strategy is proposed to further improve SR performance. The simulation and numerical results are
shown in section IV. Finally, section V concludes this paper.
Notations: Throughout the paper, matrices, vectors, and scalars are denoted by letters of bold upper
case, bold lower case, and lower case, respectively. Signs (·)T , (·)H , | · | and ‖ · ‖ represent transpose,
conjugate transpose, modulus and norm, respectively. IN denotes the N ×N identity matrix.
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Figure 1 System model with FD receiver.
2 SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a UAV-enable wireless communications system as depicted in Fig. 1. It consists of anN -antennas
base station (Alice), a legitimate Nb-antennas UAV user (Bob) and a potentially illegal single-antenna
receiver (Eve). Assuming that Bob flies along an L1-meters-long direct path from S towards D. Bob
works in FD mode, that is, it transmits signals with N antennas while simultaneously receives messages
with the remaining Nb −N antennas. As mentioned in [18,19], the link from ground station to the UAV
user can be viewed as line-of-sight (LoS) channel, which means a single receive antenna is sufficient to
provide available channel capacity. Hence, we set Nb −N = 1.
Due to the broadcasting characteristic of wireless communications, the confidential messages conveyed
from Alice to Bob are vulnerable to eavesdropping. Two measures are introduced to solve this problem.
For the source node, AN signals are superimposed on the confidential messages to prevent the useful
information being wiretapped. From the perspective of the destination node, Bob helps itself by operating
in FD mode and transmitting AN signals to weaken the quality of Alice-to-Eve link. The transmitted
baseband signal from Alice is expressed as
s =
√
β1Pavbx+
√
(1− β1)PaPANz (1)
where Pa is the total transmit power at Alice, β1 and (1 − β1) stand for the PA factors for confidential
message and AN, respectively. x is the confidential message satisfying E
{
xHx
}
= 1, and z ∈ CN×1
means the AN vector obeying complex Gaussian distribution, i.e., z ∼ CN (0, IN ). vb ∈ CN×1 denotes the
transmit beamforming vector for controlling the confidential messages to the desired direction, andPAN ∈
CN×N is the projection matrix leading AN to the undesired direction, vHb vb = 1 and Tr{PANPHAN} = 1.
The corresponding received signal at Bob can be written as
yb =
√
gabβ1Pah
H
sdvbx+
√
gab(1 − β1)PahHsdPANz+
√
β2Pbρh
H
ddqANz + nb, (2)
where z ∼ CN (0, 1) denotes the scalar AN, and the complex additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) at
Bob is denoted by nb ∼ CN (0, σ2b ). Pb represents the total transmit power at Bob. It is noted that if
AN signal z is sent at full power, it will generate a strong self-interference. Hence, β2 is introduced to
regulate the transmit power of AN signal. gab =
α
dc
ab
represents the path loss from Alice to Bob. Here,
dab is the distance between Alice and Bob, c denotes the path loss exponent and α means the path loss
at reference distance d0. hsd ∈ CN×1 represents the steering vector from Alice to Bob, and hdd ∈ CN×1
is the loop-channel between the receiving and the transmitting antennas of Bob. qAN ∈ CN×1 stands
for the projection matrix leading AN signal sent from Bob to the undesired direction with qHANqAN = 1.
ρ ∈ [0, 1] is introduced to represent the proportion of residual self-interference after antenna and radio-
frequency cancellation.
In the same manner, the received signal at Eve is given by
ye =
√
gaeβ1Pah
H
sevbx+
√
gae(1− β1)PahHsePANz+
√
gbeβ2Pbh
H
deqANz + ne, (3)
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in which, gae =
α
dc
ae
denotes the path loss from Alice to Eve, and dae is the distance between Alice and
Eve. gbe =
α
dc
be
represents the path loss from Bob to Eve, and dbe means the distance between Alice and
Eve. hse ∈ CN×1 denotes the steering vector from Alice to Eve, and hde ∈ CN×1 denotes the steering
vector from Bob to Eve. ne ∼ CN (0, σ2e) is the complex AWGN at Eve.
For DM systems, the steering vectors in (2) and (3) have the following form
h(θ) =
1√
N
[
ej2piΨθ(1), · · · , ej2piΨθ(n), · · · , ej2piΨθ(N)
]T
, (4)
and the phase function Ψθ(n) is defined by
Ψθ(n) , − (n− (N + 1)/2)d cos θ
λ
, n = 1, 2, · · · , N, (5)
where n indexes the antenna, d represents the antenna spacing, θ denotes the directional angle, and λ
means the carrier wavelength of transmitted signal.
As per (2) and (3), the achievable rates from Alice to Bob and Eve can be expressed as
Rb = log2
(
1 +
gabPaβ1h
H
sdV˜hsd
gab(1 − β1)PahHsdP˜hsd + β2PbρhHddQ˜hdd + σ2b
)
, (6)
and
Re = log2
(
1 +
gaePaβ1h
H
seV˜hse
gae(1− β1)PahHseP˜hse + gbeβ2PbhHdeQ˜hde + σ2e
)
, (7)
where V˜ = vbv
H
b , P˜ = PANP
H
AN and Q˜ = qANq
H
AN .
As such, the achievable SR will become
Rs = max {0, Rb −Re} (8)
To maximize the above Rs, we need to solve the following optimization problem, that is
(P1) : max
β1,β2,vb,PAN ,qAN
Rs
s. t. 0 6 β1 6 1,
0 6 β2 6 1,
vHb vb = 1,
Tr{PHANPAN} = 1,
qHANqAN = 1. (9)
Obviously, this problem is difficult to tackle due to the complicated objective function. But, if the
beamforming vector vb, PAN and qAN are designed or fixed in advance, the joint optimization will reduce
into the following bivariate PA problem
(P1− 1) : max
β1,β2
Rs
s. t. 0 6 β1 6 1,
0 6 β2 6 1. (10)
For simplicity, we rewrite Rb −Re as
Rb −Re = log2
(
1 +
Aβ1
(1− β1)B + β2C + σ2b
)
− log2
(
1 +
Dβ1
(1− β1)E + β2F + σ2e
)
, (11)
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where
A = gabPah
H
sdV˜hsd, (12)
B = gabPah
H
sdP˜hsd, (13)
C = Pbρh
H
ddQ˜hdd, (14)
D = gaePah
H
seV˜hse, (15)
E = gaePah
H
seP˜hse, (16)
F = gbePbh
H
deQ˜hde. (17)
Let Rb −Re = F(β1, β2), optimization problem (10) can be further reduced into
(P1− 2) : max
β1,β2
max{0,F(β1, β2)}
s. t. 0 6 β1 6 1,
0 6 β2 6 1. (18)
For above objective function, the following equation holds
max
β1,β2
max{0,F(β1, β2)} = max{0,max
β1,β2
F(β1, β2)} (19)
Since F(β1, β2) = 0 is feasible at β1 = 0, we have
max
β1,β2
F(β1, β2) > 0 (20)
Herein, the optimization problem (18) turns to be
(P1− 3) : max
β1,β2
F(β1, β2)
s. t. 0 6 β1 6 1,
0 6 β2 6 1. (21)
In other words, the optimization problem (10) is equivalent to
(PA1) : max
β1,β2
F(β1, β2)
= log2
−A2β21 +B1β22 + C2β1β2 +D2β1 + E1β2 + F1
−A1β21 +B1β22 + C1β1β2 +D1β1 + E1β2 + F1
s. t. 0 6 β1 6 1,
0 6 β2 6 1. (22)
where
A1 = B(D − E), (23)
B1 = CF, (24)
C1 = C(D − E)−BF, (25)
D1 = (D − E)(B + σ2b )−B(E + σ2b ), (26)
E1 = C(E + σ
2
e) + F (B + σ
2
b ), (27)
F1 = (B + σ
2
b )(E + σ
2
e), (28)
A2 = E(A−B), (29)
C2 = F (A−B)− CE, (30)
D2 = (A−B)(E + σ2e)− E(B + σ2b ), (31)
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Observing (22), the expression of function F(β1, β2) indicates that Rs is continuous and differentiable
with respect to β1, β2 in closed interval [0, 1]. Hence, the promising optimal β1 and β2 must be either
endpoints or stationary points. As such, we need to find out all the stationary points by vanishing the
first-order derivative of F(β1, β2) with respect to β1 and β2. On this basis, the optimal β1, β2 will be
selected by comparing the values of F(β1, β2) among the set of all candidate points to the critical numbers.
3 PROPOSED PA STRATEGY OF MAX-SR
In this section, we employ NSP scheme to guarantee that the legitimate UAV receiver will not be affected
by the AN signal, while at the same time the potentially illegal eavesdropper will be seriously distorted.
Besides, from the aspect of Bob, we expect that all the AN signal transmitted by Bob will interfere
the quality of the Alice-to-Eve link and minimize AN signal leakage to itself. Then the PA factors are
iteratively solved.
3.1 Design vb, PAN and qAN
MRT is applied to form the transmit beamforming vector at Alice
vb = hsd. (32)
In order to make AN signal emitted by Alice free of any interference to Bob, PAN is designed to project
z into the null space of hHsd. Therefore, the projection matrix PAN is given by
PAN = IN − hsdhHsd. (33)
To further interfere with Eve, Bob will also transmit AN signal, which generates a strong self-
interference. Motivated by this, we design beamforming vector qAN to minimize the AN signal leakage
to Bob, called maximizing AN-to-leakage-and-noise ratio (ANLNR),
(P2) :max
qAN
ANLNR(qAN )
s. t. qHANqAN = 1, (34)
where
ANLNR(qAN ) =
β2Pbq
H
ANhdeh
H
deqAN
qHAN (β2Pbhddh
H
dd + σ
2
eIN )qAN
. (35)
Using the generalized Rayleigh-Ritz ratio theorem in [31], the optimal qAN can be obtained from the
eigenvector corresponding to the largest eigen-value of the matrix
[β2Pbhddh
H
dd + σ
2
eIN ]
−1hdeh
H
de. (36)
Notice that the above matrix is rank-one, we can obtain the closed-form solution to (34) as
qAN =
[β2hddh
H
ddPb + σ
2
eIN ]
−1hde
‖[β2hddhHddPb + σ2eIN ]−1hde‖2
. (37)
On this basis, we will detail the PA scheme to solve β1 for fixed β2 in what follows.
3.2 Optimize β1 for fixed β2
For fixed β2, the stationary points with respect to β1 should satisfy the following equation
∂F(β1, fixed β2)
∂β1
=
(A1B3 −A2D3)β21 + 2(A1C3 −A2C3)β1 +B3C3 − C3D3
(−A1β21 +D3β1 + C3)2
= 0, (38)
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where
B3 = D2 + C2β2, (39)
C3 = (E1 +B1β2)β2 + F1, (40)
D3 = D1 + C1β2, (41)
which yields
β1,1 =
−(A1C3 −A2C3) +
√
∆1
A1B3 −A2D3 , (42)
β1,2 =
−(A1C3 −A2C3)−
√
∆1
A1B3 −A2D3 , (43)
in which
∆1 = (A1C3 −A2C3)2 − (A1B3 −A2D3)(B3C3 − C3D3). (44)
Considering β1 ∈ [0, 1], we obtain the candidate set for the critical numbers of function F(β1, fixed β2)
as
S1(fixed β2) = {0, β1,1, β1,2, 1}. (45)
In the following, we need to decide which β1 is the optimal solution to maximize the function F(β1, fixed β2)
in the four candidate points. Obviously, β1 = 0 means that there is no confidential messages transmitted
to Bob. Thus, β1 = 0 should be removed from the above candidate set. Now we only need to discuss the
remaining three candidate points F(β1,1, fixed β2), F(β1,2, fixed β2) and F(1, fixed β2).
Below, let us discuss this issue in different cases of ∆1. First case is ∆1 < 0, then the two real roots
β1,1 and β1,2 will not exist. On this basis, we need to check the following three cases.
Case 1. A1B3 − A2D3 > 0, F(β1, fixed β2) is a monotonously increasing function and will achieve its
maximum value at β1 = 1.
Case 2. A1B3 −A2D3 = 0, the stationary point is β1,3 = C3D3−B3C32(A1C3−A2C3) . We obtain the PA factor β1 by
comparing the value of F(β1,3, fixed β2) and F(1, fixed β2).
Case 3. A1B3 − A2D3 < 0, F(β1, fixed β2) is a monotonously decreasing function. Therefore, the PA
factor is β1 = 0. This result leads to a contradict with what was discussed above.
The second case is ∆1 > 0, we need to judge whether β1,1 and β1,2 meet the condition that the PA
factor β1 lies in the interval of (0, 1). Then, compare the values of F(β1, fixed β2) at the endpoints and
corresponding stationary points to get the β1. There are four different cases.
Case 1. If β1,1 ∈ (0, 1), β1,2 ∈ (0, 1), then compare the values of F(β1,1, fixed β2), F(β1,2, fixed β2) and
F(1, fixed β2).
Case 2. If β1,1 ∈ (0, 1), β1,2 /∈ (0, 1), then compare the values of F(β1,1, fixed β2) and F(1, fixed β2).
Case 3. If β1,1 /∈ (0, 1), β1,2 ∈ (0, 1), then compare the values of F(β1,2, fixed β2) and F(1, fixed β2).
Case 4. If β1,1 /∈ (0, 1), β1,2 /∈ (0, 1), then the value of β = 1 will be the solution.
After the above discussion, we can get the optimal transmit PA factor β∗1 for Alice.
3.3 Optimize β2 for fixed β1
Similarly, the stationary points with respect to β2 for fixed β1 can be found out by
∂F(fixed β1, β2)
∂β2
=
(B1D4 −B1B4)β22 + 2(B1E4 −B1C4)β2 +B4E4 − C4D4
(B1β22 +D4β2 + E4)
2
= 0, (46)
where
B4 = E1 + C2β1, (47)
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C4 = (D2 −A2β1)β1 + F1, (48)
D4 = E1 + C1β1, (49)
E4 = (D1 −A1β1)β1 + F1, (50)
which yields
β2,1 =
−(B1E4 −B1C4) +
√
∆2
B1D4 −B1B4 , (51)
β2,2 =
−(B1E4 −B1C4)−
√
∆2
B1D4 −B1B4 , (52)
where
∆2 = (B1E4 −B1C4)2 − (B1D4 −B1B4)(B4E4 − C4D4). (53)
Now, we obtain the candidate set of β2 for the critical numbers of function F(fixed β1, β2) as
S2(fixed β1) = {0, β2,1, β2,2, 1} . (54)
From the aspect of legitimate UAV receiver, β2 = 0 means that there is no AN sent from Bob. This
case happens when the potentially illegal receiver Eve is so weak that Bob has no need to send AN signal
to interfere with the eavesdropper. On the contrary, when the AN signal transmitted from Alice is fairly
weak, β2 = 1 may be suitable for Bob to mostly disturb Eve. Overall, there are four candidate points
F(fixed β1, 0), F(fixed β1, β2,1), F(fixed β1, β2,2) and F(fixed β1, 1) that we need to judge.
In the same way with β1, we discuss β2,1, and β2,2 in different cases of ∆2, the first case is ∆2 < 0.
Case 1. B1D4 − B1B4 > 0, F(fixed β1, β2) is a monotonously increasing function. It will achieve the
maximum value at β2 = 1.
Case 2. B1D4 −B1B4 = 0, the stationary point is β2,3 = C4D4−B4E42(B1E4−B1C4) . We obtain the PA factor β2 by
comparing the value of F(fixed β1, 0), F(fixed β1, β2,3) and F(fixed β1, 1).
Case 3. B1D4 − B1B4 < 0, F(fixed β1, β2) is a monotonously decreasing function. Therefore, the PA
factor is set as β2 = 0.
For the second case ∆2 > 0, we should judge whether the β2,1 and β2,2 meets the condition that the
PA factor β2 lies in the interval of (0, 1). Then, compare the values of F(fixed β1, β2) at the endpoints
and corresponding stationary points to get the β2. There are also four different cases.
Case 1. If β2,1 ∈ (0, 1), β2,2 ∈ (0, 1), then compare the values of F(fixed β1, 0), F(fixed β1, β2,1),
F(fixed β1, β2,2) and F(fixed β1, 1).
Case 2. If β2,1 ∈ (0, 1), β2,2 /∈ (0, 1), then compare the values of F(fixed β1, 0), F(fixed β1, β2,1) and
F(fixed β1, 1).
Case 3. If β2,1 /∈ (0, 1), β2,2 ∈ (0, 1), then compare the values of F(fixed β1, 0), F(fixed β1, β2,2) and
F(fixed β1, 1).
Case 4. If β2,1 /∈ (0, 1), β2,2 /∈ (0, 1), then compare the value of F(fixed β1, 0) and F(fixed β1, 1).
To this end, we can obtain the optimal transmit PA factor β∗2 for the UAV user.
3.4 Proposed alternating iterative algorithm
After the above discussion, we can get the optimal PA factor β1(β2) when β2(β1) is given. Next, we
propose an alternating iterative algorithm from the aspect of further improving SR performance. This
alternating iterative algorithm is established between βi1 and β
i
2 with an initial value of β
0
2 , where su-
perscript i indicates the ith iteration. Then, the feasible PA factor β01 can be obtained from (38) and
finally selected from three candidates via aforementioned two scenarios. Subsequently, with the value of
β01 , we compute the values of β
1
2 based on (46) and select the optimal PA factor from four candidates as
aforementioned. This process will be repeated until |F(βi1, βi2) − F(βi−11 , βi−12 )| is smaller than a preset
small value. To make clear, the iterative algorithm is summarized as Algorithm 1.
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Algorithm 1 Proposed alternating iterative algorithm
Initialization: i = 0, βi2 = 0.1, R
i
s = 0.
1. For given βi2, solve (38) to obtain the two stationary points (42) and (43),
2. Discuss aforementioned two scenarios to obtain optimal βi1,
3. Solve (46) with the fixed βi1, and obtain the two stationary points (51) and (52),
4. Discuss aforementioned two scenarios to obtain βi+12 ,
5. Update βi2 = β
i+1
2 , i = i+ 1,
6. Compute Ris,
7. Until |F(βi1, βi2)− F(βi−11 , βi−12 )| 6 ǫ.
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Figure 2 SR versus Pa for three methods.
4 Simulation and Discussion
To evaluate the SR performance of the proposed strategy, simulation results are presented in this section.
The system parameters are set as: the antenna spacing is d = λ/2, the path loss exponent c = 2,
the desired direction is 22◦, undesired direction is 30◦, the distance between S and D is L1=400m, the
distance between Alice and Eve is L2=200m, the UAV speed is v=10m/s. To ensure fairness, the transmit
power used in HD mode is the summation of the Alice itself and the actual transmit power of Bob.
Fig. 2 plots the curves of SR versus Pa for the proposed PA strategy when the UAV user operates
in FD mode and HD mode. For comparison, FD mode with fixed PA factor is also introduced. From
Fig. 2, we can clearly see that the SR increases gradually with the transmit power Pa no matter Bob
operates in FD or HD mode. For any fixed transmit power Pa, it is manifest that the FD mode achieves
a substantial SR performance gain over the HD mode and shows a great improvements over the case of
fixed PA factor. However, the HD mode achieves a little bit of SR performance gains over the FD mode
with fixed PA factor β1 = β2 = 0.5. It reveals that FD mode is not always more reliable than HD mode
because of the existence of inevitable self-interference. This also verifies that, for the FD UAV user, our
proposed PA strategy is valid to achieve a power balance between the efficient AN signal and redundant
self-interference.
Fig. 3 shows the curves of SR versus R (the flight distance between Bob and Alice) for the proposed
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Figure 4 SR versus Pa for different number of antennas.
strategy when the UAV user operates in FD mode and HD mode. Also, FD mode with fixed PA factors is
taken into consideration as β1 = β2 = 0.5. From this figure, we can observe that the proposed strategy in
FD mode shows a remarkable improvement over the case of HD mode. And PA factors generated by the
proposed iterative algorithm is superior to the fixed case from the aspect of SR performance. Specifically,
with Bob flying far away form Alice, the SR performance gain becomes more significant.
Fig. 4 illustrates the curves of SR versus Pa for different antenna numbers when the UAV user operates
in HD mode with the proposed strategy. It is obvious that when the transmit power is fixed, increasing
the number of antennas can increase SR performance. Therefore, we can add the number of antennas to
reduce the transmit power and deploy more antennas to make up for the secrecy rate.
Fig. 5 shows the curves of β1 versus the flight distance between Alice and Bob (R) for the proposed
strategy. It can be clearly seen that with R getting close to the distance between Alice and Eve (L2),
β1 begins to increase. Particularly, β1 achieves the maximum value at R = L2. On the contrary, when
Bob flies farther than the distance between Alice and Eve (R > L2), β1 tends to decrease. It reveals
that Alice allocates more power to transmit confidential messages when Bob flies towards Eve, and more
power is used to generate AN signals when Bob flies farther away from Eve to Alice. In addition, we can
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obviously observe that at a fixed position, β1 increases as the transmit antennas, which means that as
the number of transmit antennas increases, the power Alice allocated to send confidential messages also
grows. This accounts for the reason that deploying more antennas will result in an improvement on SR
performance as shown in Fig. 4.
Compared with Fig. 5, Fig. 6 illustrates the curves of β2 versus the flight distance between Bob and
Alice for the proposed strategy. It is seen from this figure that when Bob flies towards Eve (R < L2),
it increases power for transmitted AN signals to defend against the eavesdropper. And when it flies
away (R > L2), the AN power will slow down. All these curves disclose that the eavesdropper becomes
sensitive when |R− L2| approaches zero, in which case, Alice and Bob need more power to generate AN
signals for degrading the quality of the Alice-to-Eve link.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigated a secure wireless system with a FD UAV user. To improve the SR per-
formace, a low-complexity alternating iterative algorithm was proposed to realize a loop between the
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two PA factors. Firstly, in order to simplify the complicated joint optimization problem, MRT, NSP and
Max-ANLNR criterion were adopted to construct the beamforming vector vb, the AN projection matrices
PAN and qAN . Then, it turned to address the bivariate PA optimization problem with the remaining
two PA factors. Actually, the simplified objective function was continuous and differentiable with respect
to either the PA factor β1 or β2. By discussing the set of critical points, we attained the optimal value
of one PA factor when the other was fixed. Finally, the alternating iterative algorithm between β1 and
β2 was proposed to further enhance the SR. Simulations shown that the PA strategy in FD mode can
improve the SR performance compared with the fixed PA factors in FD mode. And it also outperformed
the case where the UAV user operated in HD mode. Moreover, the SR performance of the proposed
strategy grown with the increasing of the Pa and the number of transmit antennas. The results disclosed
that deploying more antennas and increasing the transmit power are beneficial to enhance the security
of UAV-aided DM wireless system.
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